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Issue 2

COURTREPORTS

The court denied Donovan's motion for summary judgment, his
petition for injunctive relief, and his claim for damages for the taking
of his private property withoutjust compensation.
Jacobj Schlesinger

Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 464 F. Supp. 2d 1171
(M.D. Fla. 2006) (holding that the United States Army Corps of Engineers' issuance of a general permit for a development project encompassing 48,150 acres of wetlands in the Florida panhandle, though extraordinary, did not go beyond the scope of Corps' authority and correctly followed all necessary Clean Water Act, National Environmental
Policy Act, and United States Environmental Protection Agency standards).
During the Spring of 2005, the Sierra Club and the Natural Resources Defense Council filed suit against the United States Corps of
Engineers ("Corps") in the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Florida on six grounds: (1) that the extensive amount of
land covered in the general permit was beyond the scope of the Clean
Water Act's ("CWA") general permitting scheme; (2) that the authorized activities were not "similar in nature"; (3) that the permit would
cause more than minimal adverse impacts and that the Corps had not
calculated those impacts properly; (4) that the Corps had not followed
the United States Environmental Protection Agency's ("EPA") standards for applying the CWA; (5) that the Corps had not taken a "hard
look" at the project under the National Environmental Policy Act
("NEPA"); and (6) that the Corps erroneously issued a Finding of No
Significant Impact ("FONSI") after completion of its Environmental
Assessment ("EA"). In August 2005, the Sierra Club filed a motion for
preliminary injunction which the court granted on restricted grounds,
halting one of five projects already approved under the general permit,
and placed a moratorium on further authorizations until it resolved
the instant case.
In 2000, the Corps noticed a rising number of permit applications
from St. Joe Company, Inc. ("St. Joe") to dredge and fill wetlands in
the Florida Panhandle. St. Joe traditionally raised pine trees in its wetlands, but the company expressed its desire to commercially and residentially develop its land. In response, the Corps sought to develop a
large-scale plan for the region and entered negotiations with the company. In June 2004, the Corps granted a general permit that controlled development of 48,150 acres, or seventy-five square miles.
Unlike individual project permits, the Corp may issue a general permit
on a regional level, which allows dredging and filling for an "entire
category of activities, provided that the activities are similar in nature
and will cause only minimal adverse environmental effects, both separately and cumulatively." After the Corps issues a general permit,
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landowners need only "authorization" from the Corps to dredge and
fill, making the process "far less onerous." The Corps may place additional terms on any project.
The Corps' permit limited impacts to high-quality wetlands on 125
acres, and limited impacts on low-quality wetlands to twenty percent in
any one of nineteen sub-basins identified by the Corps. St. Joe owns
more than seventy-five percent of the acreage included in the permit.
St. Joe promised 13,200 acres of conservation easements to the Florida
Department of Environmental Protection ("DEP"), as well as entered
into a thirty-page Ecosystem Management Agreement ("EMA") with
DEP that the Corps included in the NWP general permit.
In their first argument, the Sierra Club stated that the scope of the
permit "obliterated" the distinction between individual and general
permits, and thereby ignored the policy reasons for having the two
categories. The Corps usually issued general permits for projects like
building utility lines. However, this permit granted a range, from construction of hospitals to golf courses. The Sierra Club further argued
that landowners escaped the important and detailed review of individual permits for these widely varied projects, and "bought" the Corps'
deference with the promise to conserve so much acreage.
The Corps countered that without a "holistic" view of this vast
amount of uniform acreage, a piecemeal approach to permitting could
result in greater harm, and validated its discretion under agency privilege. The court held it could not rule on whether the permit was "unprecedented" in size, but only if the Corps followed the proper procedures. The court held that Congressional intent for the general permit
was, in fact, to reduce paperwork and free the Corps from reviewing
every dredge project in a region. Additionally, "the novelty or scope of
a general permit's proposed usage does not alone create grounds for
the Court to find it to be outside the law."
Second, the Sierra Club argued that the authorized activities for
development were not similar in nature and that the Corps acted "arbitrarily or capriciously." As explained above, the Sierra Club envisioned
varied projects under the Corps category of "suburban development."
The Sierra Club argued that the language of the general permit under
the CWA was not ambiguous, and that the CWA does not allow this
broad range of projects under "similar in nature." However, even if
the language is ambiguous, it argued that the Corps should not be allowed the deference under the Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NaturalResources
Defense Council, Inc., standard, but instead must prove a "power to persuade" under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., depending on "thoroughness,
logic, and expertness," as determined in United States v. Mead Corp.
The court held the language ambiguous. The Corps argued that
because it had limited the width of roads in the area, the developer
could only develop the area for suburban use as opposed to other sorts
of development. The court performed a statutory interpretation test
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because the "similar in nature" language created either narrow or
broad categories. Without clear legislative intent, the court followed
the Chevron test and read the Corps own regulations. The court held
the Corps' regulations "impermissibly" overstepped its bounds, and so
finally the court followed the "power to persuade" test. The court held
the Corps had correctly interpreted the "similar in nature" language by
holding a four-year discussion with landowners, government agencies
and the public in the area, by restricting road widths, and because
Congress let the Secretary interpret the language by not including a
definition, the court was convinced, "although this is admittedly an
extremely close call."
Third, the Sierra Club claimed that the Corps violated the CWA
because the permit allowed more than "minimal adverse environmental impacts." The Sierra Club brought three arguments: (1) the
impacts would not be "minimal" per se, (2) the Corps would not rely on
future projects of mitigation to net impacts; and (3) the Corps lacked
scientific support.
While neither the CWA nor the Corps' regulations defined what
"minimal" meant, a decision in the Fourth Circuit convinced the court
to allow the earlier preliminary injunction because "the actual projects
to be authorized . . . were unknown . . . the Corps could not assess

what impacts of any projects would be in advance of the permit's issuance." The Fourth Circuit vacated that ruling before the instant case
began, and so the court looked anew at the issue.
The Sierra Club argued that because development would destroy at
least 1500 acres of wetlands, and the Corps has a stated goal of"no net
loss" of wetlands, the impacts can not be "minimal" per se. The court
used the "power to persuade" test to determine the meaning of "minimal," allowing the Corps to make its argument for interpretation. The
court held that the statute did not require the Corps to make a "preproject" acreage determination. It also held that, as the majority landowner, St. Joe was bound to the DEP by the permit; that the general
permit served as a backdrop to guide development in the region; and
conservation easements would be in place. However, after calculations,
the court held that the Corps had relied on future mitigation projects
and condition to arrive at its "minimal" impact assessment. Therefore,
the court turned to the Sierra Club's second argument regarding
,'minimal:" that the Corps improperly relied on those post-permit
measures.
The Corps' interpretation of "minimal adverse environmental effects" was "net effects." The agency argued that the special conditions
within the permit supplied their basis for calculating "net effects."
Those conditions included stormwater treatment requirements, specific guidelines for fill material, buffers between pristine areas and development, the caps on high and low-quality wetland impacts, and that
the Corps could add additional terms needed to "minimize adverse
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effects." With future mitigation measures included, the Corps found
an actual net increase in wetlands because of future restoration to St.
Joe's pine tree farms, which had degraded some wetlands area.
The court held in the Corps' favor, finding the Corps relied on
mitigation in the past to calculate impacts. Secondly, EPA guidelines
used mitigation to assess environmental benefits. And finally, while the
individual impacts would not be known for each project, the Corps had
already determined "overall limits of the impacts."
The final aspect of the Sierra Club's argument against the Corps'
determination of "minimal adverse environmental impacts" was that
the Corps' science was flawed on four levels: (1) the mitigation plans
were too vague; (2) the calculations lacked "scientific rigor"; (3) the
mitigation plans were not adequate; and (4) the Corps had not addressed water quality purposes under the CWA. The court rejected
each claim in turn.
The Sierra Club claimed that the mitigation plans only contained
preferences and not details regarding the mitigation plans. The court
held that the pre-authorization meetings before the Corps would authorize a project provided the appropriate venue to work out the details of mitigation measures. Next, the court held the Corps had completed significant scientific work and linked impacts with the proposed
mitigation. The court gave deference to the Corps on technical and
scientific matters. Additionally, the court held the Corps calculations
accounted for risk of failure and "temporal loss of functioning," and
therefore the plans were adequate. Finally, the Sierra Club argued that
the Corps had not explored the differing possibilities of water quality
issues stemming from differences in run-off from a golf-course to runoff from a parking lot. The court held the argument unconvincing, as
the permit's requirements for water quality were higher than Florida's
water quality requirements, and therefore necessarily met the EPA's
requirements unless the EPA added "other water quality aspects." Instead, the EPA endorsed the permit.
The Sierra Club's fourth major argument was that the Corps did
not follow the EPA's 404(b) (1) guidelines in granting the permit.
Those guidelines "set forth regulations regarding compliance, testing,
evaluation, and minimization of adverse effects" in order to perform a
benefit/detriment test. Failure would require a remand to the Corps.
The Sierra Club pointed to language that activities under a general
permit must be similar in their water quality impacts. It, once again,
highlighted the diverse variety of activities potentially permitted. The
court held the Corps' determination of the uniformity of the wetlands
sufficient. Additionally, the Sierra Club argued that the Corps had not
set forth in writing a "precise description of activities to be permitted."
Though the court held the Corps had not done so, the court held a
remand unnecessary because the error was harmless; the Corps could
easily fix the oversight.
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The Sierra Club's final argument questioned the Corps compliance
with NEPA. Federal agencies are required to perform an EA to determine if a broader, more detailed Environmental Impact Statement
("EIS") is required. After the Corps' completed the EA, it issued a
FONSI and therefore was not required to perform an EIS. For an
agency to reach a FONSI, NEPA requires that agency to take a "hard
look" at the evidence to satisfy the process. However, United States
Supreme Court precedent indicates a court must be "highly deferential" regarding technical or scientific evidence. The Sierra Club questioned the agency's "hard look," their FONSI determination, and
whether the Corps had completed the appropriate alternatives analysis.
The court held the Corps had satisfied each claim.
The court looked at the 4500 pages of record and held that the
Corps did not need NEPA to "remind it to take a hard look at the impacts of its actions." It already had. Regarding the FONSI determination, the Corps admitted to relying on mitigation measures. The court
held mitigation measures must be "more than a possibility." They must
"constitute an adequate buffer so as to render such impacts so minor as
to not warrant an EIS." The court held that the science supported
both the mitigation and the special conditions attached to the permit.
Finally, regarding the Corps' search for alternatives, the court held the
Corps had detailed a no action alternative and individual permitting
alternative in its EA. The court held the Sierra Club's argument inadequate because it lacked a genuine discussion, only "summarily dismisses" the Corps' work, and had no suggestions of its own. Further,
an EA requires a lower standard of alternatives discussion than an EIS.
In addition to holding in favor of the Corps on all of the Sierra
Club's claims, the court also vacated the preliminary injunction. The
court ended by holding the Corps' issuance of the permit, "is at, but
not beyond, the outer limits of that authority."
Zackary Smith
Ky. Waterways Alliance v. Johnson, 426 F. Supp. 2d 612 (W.D. Ky.
2006) (holding that the EPA did not act arbitrarily or capriciously
when it approved the procedures providing administrative and judicial
review under Kentucky's permitting process and that Kentucky's
antidegradation procedures meet the requirements of the CWA).
Kentucky Waterways Alliance ("Waterways") sought summary judgment against United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA");
Waterways asserted that the EPA acted arbitrarily and capriciously
when it approved Kentucky's Tier II Antidegradation Rules and did not
ensure the protection of existing "high quality" water as required by
the Clean Water Act ("CWA"). States establish their own methods for
identifying which waters in its boundaries require Tier II protection
and the EPA may give final approval to the chosen method. When a

